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NATIONWIDE INJUNCTIONS
Russell L. Weaver*
Conversation overheard in Heaven: “Saint Peter, Saint Peter,
come quick, God thinks that he is a federal judge.”1
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III.

Although U.S. federal courts have issued nationwide injunctions for
nearly half-a-century, such injunctions have become quite commonplace in
recent decades.2 Although nationwide injunctions can be issued against
private entities, they are commonly used to enjoin governmental entities
(during both Democratic and Republican administrations) from enforcing
laws and policies.3 The distinguishing feature of such injunctions is that they
purport to apply not only to the named plaintiffs in the litigation but to
everyone else who might be subject to the challenged law or regulation
anywhere in the country.
Scholarly views regarding the wisdom and desirability of nationwide
injunctions vary. Some question the appropriateness of such injunctions. For
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1

Unknown origin.

2

Samuel L. Bray, Multiple Chancellors: Reforming the National Injunction, 131 HARV. L. REV.
417, 420 (2017) (suggesting that the national injunction is a “recent development in the history of equity”
and one that did not become prominent until the second half of the twentieth century).
3 See Monsanto v. Geersten Seed Farms, 561 U.S. 139 (2010); Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555
U.S. 488 (2009); Scheidler v. Nat’l Org. for Women, Inc., 547 U.S. 9 (2006); Nat’l Credit Union Admin.
v. First Nat’l Bank & Tr. Co., 522 U.S. 479 (1998); Immigration & Naturalization Servs. v. Nat’l Ctr. for
Immigrants Rights, Inc., 502 U.S. 183 (1991); Lujan v. Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n, 497 U.S. 871 (1990); Walters
v. Nat’l Ass’n of Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 305 (1985); Selective Serv. Sys. v. Minn. Pub. Interest
Research Grp., 468 U.S. 841 (1984); Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682 (1979).
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example, Professor Samuel Bray has flatly stated that federal court
injunctions should protect “the plaintiff vis-a-vis the defendant” and “should
not constrain the defendant’s conduct vis-a-vis nonparties.”4 Professor
Douglas Laycock generally agrees, arguing that “the court in an individual
action should not globally prohibit a government agency from enforcing an
invalid regulation; the court should order only that the invalid regulation not
be enforced against the individual plaintiff.”5 Others disagree. For example,
Professor Amanda Frost has argued that in “some cases, nationwide
injunctions are the only means to provide plaintiffs with complete relief, or
to prevent harm to thousands of individuals who cannot quickly bring their
own cases before the courts.”6 She identifies three categories of cases where
she believes that nationwide injunctions are appropriate: when such
injunctions “are the only method of providing the plaintiff with complete
relief; when they are the only means of preventing irreparable injury to
individuals similarly situated to plaintiffs; and when they are the only
practical remedy because a more limited injunction would be chaotic to
administer and would impose significant costs on the courts or others.”7 She
argues that, when “nationwide injunctions can serve one or more of these
goals, the benefits of such an injunction may outweigh the costs.”8
This short article examines the wisdom and desirability of allowing trial
courts to enter nationwide injunctions, as well as how such injunctions have
fared in the U.S. Supreme Court.
I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF NATIONWIDE INJUNCTIONS
Nationwide injunctions are a relatively recent phenomenon. Indeed, the
“older English and American practice suggested that an injunction should
restrain the defendant’s conduct vis-à-vis the plaintiff, not against the entire
world.”9 In the U.S., no nationwide injunctions were issued in the nineteenth
century.10 For example, in Georgia v. Atkins,11 the State of Georgia sought to
challenge a federal tax imposed on it. In enjoining the tax, the court did not
4

Bray, supra note 2, at 469.

5

Howard Wasserman, “Nationwide” Injunctions Are Really “Universal” Injunctions and They
Are Never Appropriate, 22 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 335, 339 (2018) (internal quotations omitted)
(“[C]ourts should not issue injunctions protecting beyond the plaintiffs to the case. An injunction in a
constitutional case should protect the plaintiffs from government enforcement of the invalid law against
them; it should not prohibit the government from enforcing the law against the universe of non-parties to
the litigation, absent a new or broader injunction protecting them.”).
6

Amanda Frost, In Defense of Nationwide Injunctions, 93 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1065, 1065 (2018).

7

Id. at 1090.

8

Id.

9

Bray, supra note 2, at 420.

10

Id. at 428.

11

Georgia v. Atkins, 10 F. Cas. 241 (C.C.N.D. Ga. 1866).
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enjoin the government from enforcing the tax against other states, or even
specifically against the State of Georgia, but rather enjoined only the
particular tax at issue in that case.12
Professor Bray identifies the U.S. Supreme Court’s holding in
Frothingham v. Mellon,13 as illustrating the early judicial aversion to
nationwide injunctions.14 In that case, the Court emphasized the limited
nature of federal court jurisdiction:
If one taxpayer may champion and litigate such a cause, then
every other taxpayer may do the same, not only in respect of
the statute here under review but also in respect of every
other appropriation act and statute whose administration
requires the outlay of public money, and whose validity may
be questioned.15
The Court emphasized that “no precedent sustaining the right to maintain
suits like this has been called to our attention.”16
Even the wave of injunctions issued against New Deal legislation in the
1930s (some 1,600 injunctions in all) did not involve nationwide
injunctions.17 Indeed, the only early injunction that departed from this
approach was the lower-court injunction issued in Hammer v. Dagenhart,18
but that injunction extended only to an entire federal district.19
Despite the early “uncertainty” and “discomfort” with the idea of using
national injunctions, such injunctions had become “an ordinary part of the
remedial arsenal of the federal courts” by the 1980s and 1990s.20 Since then,
courts have issued nationwide injunctions in an extraordinary array of
contexts: to prevent the planting of an altered strain of alfalfa,21 to prohibit
the U.S. Forest Service from exempting salvage timber sales from notice and
comment processes,22 to prohibit protest activities at abortion clinics,23 to

12

See Bray, supra note 2, at 428.

13

Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 477 (1923).

14

See Bray, supra note 2, at 431–32.

15

Frothingham, 262 U.S. at 487.

16

Id.

17

See Bray, supra note 2, at 434–35.

18

Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918).

19

See Bray, supra note 2, at 436 (“The federal district judge held the law unconstitutional and
granted the injunction the plaintiffs requested—an injunction restraining the enforcement of the statute
within the Western District of North Carolina. The injunction thus went further than merely prohibiting
enforcement against the plaintiffs.”).
20

See id. at 428.

21

See Monsanto Co. v. Geersten Seed Farms, 561 U.S. 139 (2010).

22

See Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488 (2009).

23

See Scheidler v. Nat’l Org. for Women, Inc., 547 U.S. 9 (2006).
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prohibit a credit union from expanding its field of membership,24 to enjoin
the government from imposing release bonds on excludable aliens that barred
them from seeking employment,25 to prohibit the Bureau of Land
Management’s “land withdrawal review program,”26 to enjoin a regulation
limiting the fees that could be paid to attorneys for handling service
connected death or disability benefits cases,27 to enjoin a federal regulation
that denied federal financial aid to students who failed to register for the
draft,28 and to impose procedures on the government in cases involving old
age and survivor benefits.29
By the time of the Obama and Trump administrations, such injunctions
were becoming commonplace. During the Obama administration, a Texas
trial court issued nationwide injunctions against President Obama’s Deferred
Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) and his Deferred Action for Parents
of Americans and Lawful Permanent Residents (DAPA),30 as well as against
his Department of Education’s interpretive guidance regarding the treatment
of transgender students in public schools.31 During the Trump administration,
such injunctions seem to be issued on almost a daily basis. For example, a
judge entered an injunction against President Trump’s second Executive
Order (EO) suspending for 90 days the right of nationals from six
predominantly Muslim countries from entering the United States, suspending
for 120 days the United States Refugee Admissions Program (USRAP), and
decreasing refugee admissions by more than half.32 In another case, a trial
court entered an injunction against President Trump’s order that indefinitely
barred entry into the U.S. by nationals from six predominantly Muslim
countries (Iran, Libya, Syria, Yemen, Somalia, and Chad),33 and injunctions
have been issued against a Trump administration order denying federal
funding to sanctuary cities.34
Why have nationwide injunctions become commonplace? Professor
Bray points to the Federal Declaratory Judgment Act (FDJA),35 which was
enacted in 1934. He believes that the FDJA encouraged courts to think about

24

See Nat’l Credit Union Admin. v. Nat’l Bank & Tr. Co., 522 U.S. 479 (1998).

25

See Immigration & Naturalization Servs. v. Nat’l Ctr. for Immigrants Rights, Inc., 502 U.S. 183

(1991).
26

See Lujan v. Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n, 497 U.S. 871 (1990).

27

See Walters v. Nat’l Ass’n of Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 305 (1985).

28

See Selective Serv. Sys. v. Minn. Pub. Interest Research Grp., 468 U.S. 841 (1984).

29

See Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682 (1979).

30

See United States v. Texas, 136 S. Ct. 2271, 2272 (2015), reh’g denied, 137 S. Ct. 285 (2016).

31

See Texas v. United States, 201 F. Supp. 3d 810, 835–36 (N.D. Tex. 2016).

32

See Trump v. Int’l Refugee Assistance Project, 137 S. Ct. 2080 (2017).

33

See Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2404 (2018).

34

See Cty. of Santa Clara v. Trump, 250 F. Supp. 3d 497, 507 (N.D. Cal. 2017).

35

The Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201–2202 (2010).
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the fundamental validity of statutes and to issue broad injunctions striking
down those statutes.36 In other words, the FDJA promoted facial challenges
to laws.37
Bray also argues that judges have fundamentally changed the way that
they respond to unconstitutional laws: from perceiving that they should strike
down unconstitutional laws down as opposed to simply refusing to apply or
enforce them.38 In other words, rather than viewing “courts as preventing or
remedying a specific wrong to a person and only incidentally determining the
constitutionality of a law, many now see the courts as determining the
constitutionality of a law and only incidentally preventing or remedying a
specific wrong to a person.”39 Bray suggests that these shifts have prompted
courts to view themselves as vindicating constitutional rights on a national
basis.40 Professor Frost seems to share Professor Bray’s views regarding why
nationwide injunctions have become so common place. She argues that:
At its core, the debate over nationwide injunctions is really
a debate about the role of the federal courts in the
constitutional structure. Are courts primarily intended to
resolve disputes between the parties, or do they also declare
the meaning of federal law for everyone? To what degree are
courts intended to serve as a check on the political branches,
and should their authority expand in lockstep with that of
Congress and the President?41
Bray also suggests that other considerations may have led to a
proliferation of national injunctions.42

36

See Bray, supra note 2, at 450.

37

Id.

38

Id. at 451.

39

Id.

40

That shift matters for the logic of the national injunction. If a court considers a statute
inconsistent with the Constitution, and thus does not apply it, nothing follows about the remedy. The
court has not done anything to the statute. It remains undisturbed. But on the newer conception of
what a court does—striking down or setting aside an unconstitutional statute or unlawful
regulation—a national injunction begins to have a relentless logic. If a court strikes down a statute,
regulation, or order, why should it give it respect by allowing its continued enforcement? Wouldn’t
enforcement, anywhere, offend the court’s determination that it was invalid, struck down,
obliterated? If a law is unconstitutional in all its applications, why should the court permit it to be
applied to anyone? Again, reasons can be given for stopping short—ones grounded in equitable
remedies, judicial competence, humility, separation of powers, federalism, and so on. But the logic
of the national injunction is certainly strengthened by the newer view of what judges do when one
law is inconsistent with a higher one, as well as by the metaphorical language used to express that
view.
Id. at 452.
41

Frost, supra note 6, at 1086–87.

42

Bray, supra note 2, at 452–57.
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II. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS: PRO AND CON
But is it desirable or proper for courts to issue nationwide injunctions at
all, much less routinely? There are arguments on both sides of the debate.
A. The Need for Uniformity
One argument that has been advanced in favor of nationwide injunctions
is the need for uniform application of the laws, especially immigration laws.43
Suppose, for example, that the plaintiff in one jurisdiction contends that the
current presidential administration (and, to be clear, I am not naming a
particular president because it strikes me as preferable to consider the legal
issues without regard to the particularity of who holds the presidency at a
particular moment) has adopted a policy that is allegedly unconstitutional.
The policy is challenged in one jurisdiction by individuals who claim to be
aggrieved by that policy, and the trial court decides to issue an injunction
against the policy. Arguably, if the government is enjoined in that
jurisdiction, it is inappropriate to allow the government to continue to apply
and enforce that policy in other jurisdictions. A nationwide injunction
precludes the government from doing so by effectively decreeing that the
policy cannot be enforced nationwide.44
Professor Amanda Frost states the idea a bit differently:
Without nationwide injunctions, the federal courts would be
powerless to protect thousands or millions of people from
potentially illegal or unconstitutional government policies—
policies that can be applied with minimal notice or process,
and to many who lack the ability to bring their individual
cases before the courts. The need for such injunctions is
particularly great in an era when major policy choices are
increasingly made through unilateral executive action
affecting millions.45
B. Should Trial Courts Be Imposing Nationwide Uniformity?
On the surface, this “uniformity” argument seems to make sense. If a
law or policy is unconstitutional, then it seems inappropriate to allow the
government to enforce that policy in other jurisdictions where suits have not
been brought against such policies. The difficulty with the uniformity

43

See Wasserman, supra note 5, at 338.

44

See id. at 356–59.

45

Frost, supra note 6, at 1069.
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argument is that, in a surprising number of cases, trial courts have “gotten it
wrong” in their analysis of the legal issues. In other words, they issued
nationwide injunctions that should not have been issued, and therefore
imposed “nationwide uniformity” based on incorrect or unsound reasoning.
Many of these nationwide injunctions have been vacated or modified by the
U.S. Supreme Court but not before paralyzing government for a considerable
period of time.46
Examples of erroneous nationwide injunctions abound. For example, in
Walters v. National Ass’n of Radiation Survivors,47 the U.S. Department of
Health, Education, and Welfare attempted to recoup overpayments made to
beneficiaries under the Social Security Act. The beneficiaries sued claiming
that they were entitled to a hearing before an assessment was made against
them and asked the court to certify a nationwide class and issue an injunction.
The lower court did. However, the U.S. Supreme Court found the “District
Court’s analysis of this issue totally unconvincing, and quite lacking in the
deference which ought to be shown by any federal court in evaluating the
constitutionality of an Act of Congress.”48 Indeed, the Court went on to hold
that the trial court decision inappropriately frustrated the congressional
objective of keeping the proceeding simple, and in fact would have greatly
complicated the process.49 In other words, the trial court decision created
uniformity across the nation, but the result was uniform inaccuracy.
There are lots of other examples where trial court judges have issued
erroneous rulings. Selective Service System v. Minnesota Public Interest
Research Group50 involved a suit by male college students challenging a
federal statute which denied federal student aid to students who failed to
register for the draft. The trial court issued a nationwide injunction, finding
multiple constitutional violations. In addition to concluding that the law
46 See, e.g., Trump v. Int’l Refugee Assistance Project, 137 S. Ct. 2080 (2017) (overturning the
injunction in part); Monsanto v. Geersten Seed Farms, 561 U.S. 139 (2010); Summers v. Earth Island
Inst., 555 U.S. 488 (2009); Scheidler v. Nat’l Org. for Women, Inc., 547 U.S. 9 (2006); Immigration &
Naturalization Servs. v. Nat’l Ctr. for Immigrants Rights, Inc., 502 U.S. 183 (1991); Lujan v. Nat’l
Wildlife Fed’n, 497 U.S. 871 (1990); Walters v. Nat’l Ass’n of Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 305 (1985);
Selective Serv. Sys. v. Minn. Pub. Interest Research Grp., 468 U.S. 841 (1984).
47

Walters, 473 U.S. 305.

48

Id. at 326 (“Thus, even apart from the frustration of Congress’ principal goal of wanting the
veteran to get the entirety of the award, the destruction of the fee limitation would bid fair to complicate
a proceeding which Congress wished to keep as simple as possible.”).
49 Id. at 326 (“It is scarcely open to doubt that if claimants were permitted to retain compensated
attorneys the day might come when it could be said that an attorney might indeed be necessary to present
a claim properly in a system rendered more adversary and more complex by the very presence of lawyer
representation. It is only a small step beyond that to the situation in which the claimant who has a factually
simple and obviously deserving claim may nonetheless feel impelled to retain an attorney simply because
so many other claimants retain attorneys. And this additional complexity will undoubtedly engender
greater administrative costs, with the end result being that less Government money reaches its intended
beneficiaries.”).
50

Minn. Pub. Interest Research Grp., 468 U.S. at 844.
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constituted an unconstitutional Bill of Attainder, the court found that the law
infringed the students’ privilege against self-incrimination. The U.S.
Supreme Court flatly repudiated the trial court’s analysis of the constitutional
claims, concluding that the statute was constitutional, that there was no Bill
of Attainder,51 and that there was no violation of the plaintiffs’ privilege
against self-incrimination.52 As a result, the Court vacated the injunction.
In Scheidler v. National Organization for Women, Inc.,53 the trial court
imposed a nationwide injunction restricting protest activities near abortion
clinics anywhere in the nation. The ruling was based on a federal statute54
that prohibited the use of violence in an effort to extort or rob. In Scheidler,
there were claims that anti-abortion protestors had engaged in violence, but
there was no claim that they had done so in order to extort or rob. As a result,
the U.S. Supreme Court concluded that the trial court had misconstrued and
misapplied the federal statute, and therefore the Court vacated the nationwide
injunction.
In Immigration & Naturalization Service v. National Center for
Immigrants Rights, Inc.,55 a trial court issued a nationwide injunction
precluding the government from enforcing a regulation requiring that release
bonds for excludible aliens contain a condition barring them from seeking
employment. Among other things, the court held that the regulation was
inconsistent with the agency’s governing statute and deprived aliens of the
right to due process. The U.S. Supreme Court vacated the nationwide
injunction on the basis that the agency did not violate its statutory authority.56

51 Id. at 856 (“[W]ithin the meaning of Bill of Attainder Clause, we hold that the District Court
erred in striking down § 12(f) as an impermissible attainder.”).
52 Id. at 856–57 (“However, a person who has not registered clearly is under no compulsion to
seek financial aid; if he has not registered, he is simply ineligible for aid. Since a nonregistrant is bound
to know that his application for federal aid would be denied, he is in no sense under any ‘compulsion’ to
seek that aid. He has no reason to make any statement to anyone as to whether or not he has registered.”).
53

Scheidler v. Nat’l Org. for Women, Inc., 547 U.S. 9 (2006).

54

18 U.S.C. § 1951(a) (2019).

55

Immigration & Naturalization Servs. v. Nat’l Ctr. for Immigrants Rights, Inc., 502 U.S. 183

(1991).
56 The Court did not reach the constitutional issue because it was not considered or relied on by
the court of appeals’ decision affirming the trial court’s decision. In regard to the statutory issue, the Court
concluded that:

Taken together all of these administrative procedures are designed to ensure that aliens detained and
bonds issued under the contested regulation will receive the individualized determinations mandated
by the Act in this context. For these reasons, we conclude that 8 CFR § 103.6(a)(2)(ii) (1991) is
consistent with the Attorney General’s statutory authority under § 242(a) of the INA.
Id. at 195.
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C. Promoting Judicial Economy
Another argument made in favor of nationwide injunctions is that they
promote “judicial economy.”57 The idea is that, if a law is unconstitutional,
rather than force a multitude of lawsuits all over the county, it is preferable
to have a single judge hear and decide the issue. The actions of that single
court obviate the need for numerous courts all over the country to consider
and decide the same issue.
The judicial economy argument was prominent in the analysis of the
lower courts in the Califano case. The district court decided to certify a
nationwide class composed of “all individuals eligible for [old-age and
survivors’ benefits] whose benefits have been or will be reduced or otherwise
adjusted without prior notice and opportunity for a hearing.” The court of
appeals held that it would be inappropriate to require the recipients to sue
individually because that would result in an unnecessary duplication of
actions.58 In the appellate court’s view, the “issues involved are common to
the class as a whole. They turn on questions of law applicable in the same
manner to each member of the class,” and the court decided that it is “unlikely
that differences in the factual background of each claim will affect the
outcome of the legal issue.”59 Accordingly, the appellate court concluded that
the certification of a nationwide class-action “saves the resources of both the
courts and the parties by permitting an issue potentially affecting every social
security beneficiary to be litigated in an economical fashion under Rule 23.”60
D. Judicial Economy or Precipitous Review?
However, it is not clear that the “judicial economy” argument is sound.
In Califano, both the appellate court and the trial court mis-analyzed the case
and issued a nationwide injunction when one should not have been issued.
Moreover, as will be discussed in the next section, because the injunction was
issued on a nationwide basis, the actions of the lower courts forced the U.S.
Supreme Court to become prematurely, indeed precipitously, involved in the
case.
Professor Frost cites the case of Trump v. International Refugee
Assistance Project61 as an example of a situation when a nationwide
injunction would be appropriate.62 However, one can argue that Trump

57

Wasserman, supra note 5, at 338.

58

Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682, 690 (1979).

59

Id. at 701.

60

Id.

61

Trump v. Int’l Refugee Assistance Project, 137 S. Ct. 2080 (2017).

62

Frost, supra note 6, at 1099.

112

FIU Law Review

[Vol. 14:103

illustrates the exact opposite. Because a nationwide injunction had been
issued in that case, the case hurtled through the lower courts at a precipitous
pace. After several lower courts enjoined enforcement of a Trump executive
order, the Court agreed to hear the government’s request for a stay of the
injunction on an expedited basis. Although the lower court rulings were not
rendered until late May, a petition for certiorari was filed on June 1 and the
Court directed that responses to the request for stay be filed just eleven days
later on June 12. The Court rendered its decision on the stay just fifteen days
later on June 27.
In Trump, the lower court’s injunction allowed certain types of
individuals to enter the country who would not ultimately prevail in the U.S.
Supreme Court. Indeed, the Trump Court stayed important parts of the trial
court’s injunction. In particular, it stayed: (1) the preliminary injunctions
preventing enforcement of 90-day suspension of entry into the United States
with respect to foreign nationals who lacked any bona fide relationship with
a person or entity in United States, (2) it stayed the preliminary injunctions
that stayed enforcement of a 120-day suspension of entry into the U.S. by
refugees, and (3) it stayed preliminary injunctions against enforcement of an
annual limit on refugee admissions with respect to refugees who lacked any
bona fide relationship with a person or entity in United States. So, the net
effect was that the lower court’s order erroneously allowed several classes of
individuals to enter the United States who should not have been allowed to
enter.
Likewise, in Selective Service System v. Minnesota Public Interest
Research Group, a case involving individuals who challenged the denial of
federal student assistance because of their refusal to register for the draft, the
case came quite rapidly to the U.S. Supreme Court.63 The trial court issued a
nationwide injunction on June 16, 1983, and the case was before the U.S.
Supreme Court on a request for stay on June 29, 1983. In other words, only
thirteen days later. Thereafter, the Court heard and resolved the case. In other
words, because the trial court issued a nationwide injunction, the case was
not able to percolate its way to the U.S. Supreme Court.
In most cases, a more deliberate pace might arguably be preferable. In
Walters v. National Association of Radiation Survivors,64 the U.S. Supreme
Court quickly involved itself because the trial court purported to enjoin the
operation of a federal law “across the country and under all circumstances.”65
As a result, the Court concluded that it had jurisdiction to hear the case on an
expedited basis. A concurring Justice O’Connor, joined by Justice Blackmun,
argued that the trial court “abused its discretion” in issuing a nationwide

63

Selective Serv. Sys. v. Minn. Pub. Interest Research Grp., 468 U.S. 841 (1984).

64

Walters v. Nat’l Ass’n of Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 305 (1985).

65

Id. at 319.
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injunction.66 Under the circumstances, she agreed that “expeditious” review
of the case was warranted,67 in part because the case was not framed as a class
action and did not present itself as a “complex case.”68 She felt that the
plaintiffs’ claims should have been considered individually.69 A dissenting
Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Marshall, suggested that the Court should
have refused to hear an interlocutory appeal of a nationwide injunction. He
argued that it is important to have a full development of the case so that
appellate decisions can be fully informed:
where “grave, far-reaching constitutional questions” are
presented: the records developed in preliminary-injunction
cases are “simply insufficient” to allow a final decision on
the merits; as a matter of fairness the litigants are entitled to
a full evidentiary presentation before a final decision is
reached; and where questions of constitutional law turn on
disputed fact, such decisions must initially be rendered by a
district court factfinder.70
In Walters, the Court’s unwillingness to delay review was undoubtedly
attributable to the fact that the trial court decided to enjoin application of the
regulation “across the country and under all circumstances,” rather than to
simply decide the case before it.
E. Development of the Record
Also cutting against the uniformity argument is the fact that nationwide
injunctions can have an adverse effect on the development of the law.
Historically, the government has exercised the ability to “non-acquiesce” in
a lower court decision. When the government “non-acquiesces,” it agrees to
follow the trial court’s holding in that particular jurisdiction (e.g., if the order
is issued by U.S. District Court, the government agrees to follow the order in
that district) but reserves the right to maintain the rejected position in
litigation in other jurisdictions. When the decision is rendered by a U.S. Court
of Appeals, the government might agree to acquiesce in that particular circuit
but not in other circuits.
Non-acquiescence plays a very positive role in the judicial process
because it helps provide the U.S. Supreme Court with a fuller and more
developed record and arguments. As more and more judges hear and decide
the issues presented, they clarify the issues and facts and help sharpen the
66

Id. at 336 (O’Connor, J., concurring).

67

Id.

68

Id. at 337.

69

Id.

70

Id. at 342 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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legal analysis. If all lower courts agree regarding the resolution, the U.S.
Supreme Court will frequently refuse to involve itself in the case. On the
other hand, if the lower courts disagree, then the facts and issues are often
sharpened by conflicting lower court decisions. In other words, adversarial
litigation helps ensure that the U.S. Supreme Court receives a more highly
developed record.
The U.S. Supreme Court made precisely this point in Califano v.
Yamasaki.71 Although the Court upheld aspects of a nationwide injunction in
that case, it conceded “the force of the Secretary’s contentions that
nationwide class actions may have a detrimental effect by foreclosing
adjudication by a number of different courts and judges, and of increasing, in
certain cases, the pressures on this Court’s docket.”72 The Court went to state
that it “often will be preferable to allow several courts to pass on a given class
claim in order to gain the benefit of adjudication by different courts in
different factual contexts.”73 For those reasons, the Court concluded that, “a
federal court when asked to certify a nationwide class should take care to
ensure that nationwide relief is indeed appropriate in the case before it, and
that certification of such a class would not improperly interfere with the
litigation of similar issues in other judicial districts.”74
Nevertheless, Califano concluded that nationwide injunctions might be
appropriate in certain limited situations:
Nor is a nationwide class inconsistent with principles of
equity jurisprudence, since the scope of injunctive relief is
dictated by the extent of the violation established, not by the
geographical extent of the plaintiff class. If a class action is
otherwise proper, and if jurisdiction lies over the claims of
the members of the class, the fact that the class is nationwide
in scope does not necessarily mean that the relief afforded
the plaintiffs will be more burdensome than necessary to
redress the complaining parties.75
F. Article III “Case” and “Controversy” Requirement
Under the U.S. Constitution, the federal judicial power is not
unlimited.76 On the contrary, Article III of the U.S. Constitution provides that
the judicial power is limited to the resolution of “cases” and
71

Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682 (1979).

72

Id. at 702.

73

Id.

74

Id.

75

Id.

76

See Wasserman, supra note 5, at 359–60.

2020]

Nationwide Injunctions

115

“controversies.”77 In applying the case and controversy requirement, the
Court has made it clear that the federal courts should not issue “advisory”
opinions,78 that they should not hear cases in which the plaintiffs lack
standing,79 and that there must be concrete adverseness between the parties.80
Moreover, a case may not be ripe for review if the potentially affected person
does not suffer a credible threat of prosecution.81
Of course, in many cases in which nationwide injunctions are sought,
plaintiffs frame their request for relief as a “class action,” which protects a
broad range of plaintiffs—some presently before the court, some not. Some
commentators have argued that the class action, therefore, provides courts
with a solid basis for issuing nationwide injunctions.82 However, this type of
analysis creates potential problems. A court may think that it understands the
full ramifications of a requested injunction, and it may think that it fully
understands who will be affected by an injunction and how they will be
affected, but the court may not be correct.
In some instances, the trial court’s action represents an obvious
overreach. For example, in Summers v. Earth Island Institute,83 even though
the parties had settled the underlying case, so that an Article III case or
controversy no longer existed, the trial court decided to go ahead and decide
the merits of the case and issue a nationwide injunction. The U.S. Supreme
Court reversed, concluding that the settlement deprived plaintiffs of standing
to litigate the case.84 Likewise, in Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation,85

77 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1 (“The Judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity,
arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made,
under their Authority;—to all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls;—to all
Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction;—to Controversies to which the United States shall be a
Party;—to Controversies between two or more States; between a State and Citizens of another State;—
between Citizens of different States;—between Citizens of the same State claiming Lands under Grants
of different States, and between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects.”).
78

See Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346 (1911).

79

See Arizona Christian Sch. Tuition Org. v. Winn, 563 U.S. 125 (2011); Hein v. Freedom from
Religion Found., 551 U.S. 587 (2007); DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332 (2006);
Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923).
80

See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).

81

See Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 573 U.S. 149 (2014); Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S.
136 (1967); Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497 (1961); United Pub. Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75 (1947).
82 See Frost, supra note 6, at 1084 (“The class action device further demonstrates that courts have
the constitutional authority to enjoin defendants from taking action affecting nonparties. Under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 23, a few named individuals can bring a lawsuit on behalf of all similarly situated
individuals across the nation as long as they satisfy the four class certification requirements listed in Rule
23(a), as well as Rule 23(b)(2)’s requirement that the ‘party opposing the class has acted . . . on grounds
that apply generally to the class, so that final injunctive relief . . . is appropriate respecting the class as a
whole.’”).
83

Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488, 490–92 (2009).

84

Id. at 500–01.

85

Lujan v. Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n, 497 U.S. 871 (1990).
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although the lower courts concluded that plaintiff’s injuries were sufficient
to warrant the entry of a nationwide injunction, the Court held that plaintiffs
lacked standing.
In some cases, the U.S. Supreme Court reverses or limits the scope of
an injunctive decree because the trial court’s order went well beyond the
parties before the court. For example, in Trump v. International Refugee
Assistance Project,86 although the lower courts enjoined the Trump
administration from enforcing an executive order against anyone, the Court
decided to limit the scope of the injunction to protect only those individuals
who had a “bona fide” relationship with a person or entity in the U.S.87 and
to lift the injunction as to individuals who did not have a bona fide
relationship.88 The Court found that the government’s interest was “at its
peak” when individuals with no bona fide relationship to the U.S. are
involved.89 Finding that the individual respondents had such a bona fide
relationship, the Court left the injunction in place as to them. Had the trial
court kept its focus on the parties before it, rather than certifying a nationwide
class that included individuals not before the court, the court’s order might
not have been so overbroad.90
Likewise, in Califano v. Yamasaki,91 which involved the U.S.
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare’s attempt to recoup
overpayments made to beneficiaries under the Social Security Act, the trial
court purported to certify a nationwide class composed of “all individuals
eligible for [old-age and survivors’ benefits] whose benefits have been or will
be reduced or otherwise adjusted without prior notice and opportunity for a
hearing.” The court of appeals agreed with the lower court and held that to
require recipients to sue individually would result in an unnecessary
duplication of actions and, therefore, that class relief was appropriate and that
a nationwide injunction could issue. Indeed, the court of appeals concluded
that it “is unlikely that differences in the factual background of each claim
will affect the outcome of the legal issue.” The U.S. Supreme Court
disagreed, concluding that the certified class was overbroad because it swept

86

Trump v. Int’l Refugee Assistance Project, 137 S. Ct. 2080 (2017).

87

Id. at 2087.

88

Id. at 2087–88.

89

Id. at 2088.

90

Id. (“But the injunctions reach much further than that: They also bar enforcement of § 2(c)
against foreign nationals abroad who have no connection to the United States at all. The equities relied on
by the lower courts do not balance the same way in that context. Denying entry to such a foreign national
does not burden any American party by reason of that party’s relationship with the foreign national. And
the courts below did not conclude that exclusion in such circumstances would impose any legally relevant
hardship on the foreign national himself.”).
91

Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682 (1979).
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in individuals who had not filed requests for reconsideration or waiver.92
Indeed, there was evidence suggesting that the number of individuals affected
was relatively small and that the matter probably should have been handled
through individual adjudication.93
G. Encouraging Forum Shopping
If federal courts have the power to issue nationwide injunctions, then
potential plaintiffs have powerful incentives to “forum shop” and to try to
place their cases before judges who are inclined to issue the requested
injunctions.94 It probably comes as no surprise that challenges to Obama-era
rules were brought initially in the (relatively conservative) Texas federal
courts and were appealed to the (relatively conservative) Fifth Circuit U.S.
Court of Appeals. By contrast, it will come as no more of a surprise that many
challenges to Trump administration actions are brought before (relatively
liberal) California federal court judges and, therefore, appealed to the
(relatively liberal) Ninth Circuit U.S. Court of Appeals.95
Moreover, as Bray indicates, prospective plaintiffs need only find a
single judge who is willing to grant a nationwide injunction in order to
prevail:
The opportunity for forum shopping is extended by the
asymmetric effect of decisions upholding and invalidating a
statute, regulation, or order. If a plaintiff brings an individual
action seeking a national injunction, and the district judge
92 Id. at 704 (“The relief to which the Secretary objects in this Court is the determination that he
must afford class members an opportunity for a prerecoupment oral hearing. With respect to that relief,
the classes certified were plainly too broad. Both the Elliott and the Buffington classes included persons
who had not filed requests for reconsideration or waiver in the past and would not do so in the future. As
to them, no ‘final decision’ concerning the right to a prerecoupment hearing has been or will be made.”).
93 Id. at 314–15 (“Nowhere in the opinion of the district court is there any estimate of what
percentage of the annual VA caseload of 800,000 these cases comprise, nor is there any more precise
description of the class. There is no question but what the three named plaintiffs and the plaintiff veteran’s
widow asserted such claims, and in addition there are declarations in the record from twelve other
claimants who were asserting such claims. The evidence contained in the record, however, suggests that
the sum total of such claims is extremely small; in 1982, for example, roughly 2% of the BVA caseload
consisted of “agent orange” or “radiation” claims, and what evidence there is suggests that the percentage
of such claims in the regional offices was even less—perhaps as little as 3 in 1,000.”)
94
95

Bray, supra note 2, at 457.

Id. at 459–60 (“It is no accident which courts have given the major national injunctions in the
last three administrations. In the George W. Bush Administration, it was federal courts in California. In
the Obama Administration, it was federal courts in Texas. Now, in the Trump Administration, the national
preliminary injunctions have come from federal courts in several less conservative circuits (the Fourth,
Seventh, and Ninth). The forum selection happens not only for the district court, but also for the appellate
court. The pattern is as obvious as it is disconcerting. Given the sweeping power of the individual judge
to issue a national injunction, and the plaintiff’s ability to select a forum, it is unsurprising that there would
be rampant forum shopping.”).
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upholds the challenged law, that decision has no effect on
other potential plaintiffs. But if one district judge invalidates
it and issues a national injunction, the injunction controls the
defendant’s actions with respect to everyone. Shop ‘til the
statute drops.96
One can legitimately inquire whether it is desirable to encourage forum
shopping for such important national issues. Such injunctions, if
improvidently granted, can tie up federal programs for a considerable period
of time—at least until the U.S. Supreme Court can review and overturn those
injunctions. And these roadblocks have been thrown up against both
Republican and Democratic policies.
III. CONCLUSION
Although nationwide injunctions have become increasingly
commonplace, especially during the Trump administration, they are not
necessarily a welcome or desirable addition to the law. Not uncommonly,
lower courts “get it wrong.” Indeed, in an extraordinary number of cases,
lower court injunctions have been completely overturned or significantly
modified by the U.S. Supreme Court.
Nationwide injunctions also may have an undesirable impact on the law.
Instead of allowing issues to percolate their way to the U.S. Supreme Court,
and providing that Court with the views and analysis of a variety of lower
court judges, cases involving nationwide injunctions often move quite
quickly through the court system and are rapidly presented to the Court.
Undoubtedly, this rapid pace of review is attributable to the significance of
the injunction that the lower court issued (e.g., that it purported to enjoin
governmental action nationwide).
In the past, the U.S. government has been able to adopt a position of
non-acquiescence to lower court decisions. In other words, it agrees to accept
the decision in the particular jurisdiction in which a decision was rendered
but continues to maintain a contrary position in other jurisdictions. Generally,
if the government continues to lose in these other jurisdictions, that is the end
of the matter. The U.S. Supreme Court is disinclined to review the matter.
On the other hand, if the government’s position prevails in other jurisdictions,
the U.S. Supreme Court eventually intervenes because there is a split among
the circuits that needs to be resolved. By that point, the facts and the legal
issues have come into sharper focus and the U.S. Supreme Court can more
readily decide the issues.
As a result, even some supporters of nationwide injunctions recognize
that nationwide injunctions encourage forum shopping, politicize the courts,
96

Id. at 460 (emphasis in original).
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create the risk of conflicting injunctions, and potentially give enormous
power to a single district court judge.97 Professor Bray argues that injunctions
should not protect non-parties.98

97

See Frost, supra note 6, at 1067.

98

Bray, supra note 2, at 469.

